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Federal Preemption of State Trade Secret Law:
Existing Theories and a Proposed Solution
Recent court decisions have again raised the question whether the
patent clause of the Constitution and the federal patent laws preempt
state trade secret laws. Different interpretations of the Supreme Court
decisions have led to three different theories: that all state trade secret law
should be preempted, that only trade secret law protecting patentable
subject matter should be preempted, and that no part of state trade secret
law should be preempted. To overcome the difficulties in each of these
theories, the author proposes a solution which would invalidate trade
secret protection only for inventions which meet all the standards of
patentability.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE CONSTITUTION gives Congress the power to grant an in-
ventor a monopoly for a limited time in order to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts.1 In accordance with
that grant Congress has provided that one whose time, effort, and
resources have culminated in an invention has the opportunity to
protect that invention by ,applying for a federal patent.2  If the in-
vention is patentable subject matter3 and meets the added statutory
requisites of originality,4 novelty,' usefulness,6 and nonobviousness,7
the inventor will receive a 17-year monopoly in exchange for the
disclosure of his invention.8 This scheme is designed to encourage
invention through the reward of a limited monopoly.' There are,
however, some inventors who do not apply for a patent, but instead
choose to keep their inventions secret. In addition, most inventions
do not meet all the statutory requirements for a patent, so inventors
must rely upon secrecy to use their inventions profitably or to sell
them. States have protected this interest in secrecy, and thus a body
of trade secret law has evolved.' 0 Although trade secret law may
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
235 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970). See generally 2 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 102 (2d ed. 1964).
3 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). See 1 A. DELLER, supra note 2, §§ 10-29.
435 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115 (1970). See 1 A. DELLER, supra note 2, § 31.
5 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1970). See 1 A. DELLER, supra note 2, §§ 54-82.
6 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). See 1 A. DELLER, supra note 2, §§ 83-101.
735 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). See 2 A. DELLER, supra note 2, §§ 106-09.
8 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
9 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484
(1944).
IoRESTATMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939) defines a trade secret
as follows:
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be said to foster secrecy, rather than the sharing of ideas for the
public good, its justification is in the prevention of industrial dishon-
esty, misappropriation of secrets, and breaches of contracts and confi-
dential relationships."
Until recently, the constitutionality of state trade secret laws had
not been challenged, and their existence had been recognized by
the Supreme Court. 2 Within the last 10 years, however, the valid-
ity of trade secret law has been questioned on constitutional
grounds, principally as a result of three cases: Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 3 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,14 and
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins."3  The companion cases Sears and Compco
held that states may not enjoin through unfair competition laws
the copying of unpatented articles which are on the market, because
to do so would conflict with federal patent laws. Lear held that
a patent licensee is not estopped from challenging the underlying
validity of the patent, for the estoppel principle applied in that con-
text could undermine patent law. Further, the Court in Lear called
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device or
list of customers.
The liability for disclosure of a trade secret is succinctly stated in RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 (1939):
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by
the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it
was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means
or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty
to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that
its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
In addition states have provided criminal penalties for misappropriation of trade se-
crets. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (B) (Page Supp. 1972). See generally
R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS (1953); A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS (1962).
"
1 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 7 (1939): "[A trade se-
cret's] protection is not based on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging
the development of secret processes or devices. The protection is merely against breach
of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret."
12 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); Becher
v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929); E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder
Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
13 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
14 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
15 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
TRADE SECRET PREEMPTION
for a reevaluation of all state court decisions that enforce the con-
tractual rights of inventors without patents.
These cases left open the question whether the patent clause
and federal patent law preempt all trade secret law. Courts faced
with the issue have generally concluded that they do not.'0 For
instance, in Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co.17 the
Fourth Circuit held that the patent clause did not preempt the state
from enjoining the use of secret information obtained through a
breach of confidence. But a rift in the circuits occurred when the
Sixth Circuit recently decided Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.'
Kewanee held that state trade secret law which protects an invention
that is an appropriate subject for a patent and has been commer-
cially used for more than a year conflicts with the policies and pur-
poses of the patent clause and the patent laws.'9 Former employees
of Kewanee formed Bicron Corporation and, with the knowledge
they had received while in Kewanee's employ, produced in 9 months
a crystal for use in radiation detection that was ostensibly the same
as one it had taken Kewanee 16 years to develop. Although the
process involved in growing the crystal was patentable subject mat-
ter,20 Kewanee could no longer have obtained a patent by the time
the process was duplicated, because the crystals had been in com-
merical use for more than one year.2 ' Kewanee, relying upon Ohio
law, sought to enjoin Bicron from producing the crystals under a
theory of misappropriation of trade secrets. It argued that each
of the former employees had signed at least one agreement not to
disclose the secrets, and that employees had breached their agree-
ments, since it would have been impossible to reproduce the crystal
independently in such a short time.
Although the court found that the former employees had indeed
misappropriated the plaintiff's trade secrets, it denied the requested
10 Four circuits have upheld trade secret law since Sears and Cornpco, and two
of those cases postdate Lear. as well. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216
(2d Cir. 1971); Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemi-
cals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co.,
337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966). See also Schulen-
burg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.X.2d 865 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
959 (1966).
17 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383.U.S. 934 (1966).
18 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 818 (1973). See 53 BOSTON
U.L. REV. 1142 (1973); 42 U. ON. L REV. 794 (1973).
19 478 F.2d at 1086.
20 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). See note 79 infra.
2135 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970). See note 81 infra.
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relief. Looking to Sears and Compco and heeding the directive of
Lear to reexamine state law enforcing contractual rights of inven-
tors, the court concluded that Ohio could not grant Kewanee trade
secret protection without conflicting with the federal patent laws.
2 "
The main concern of the appellate court was that the use of trade
secret law could effectively extend a commercial monopoly beyond
the 17 years granted under a patent.2 3
This Note sets forth the competing arguments on the viability
of trade secret law and suggests a scheme that will preserve the
necessary aspects of that law without conflicting with the patent
clause and the federal patent laws.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE JUDICIAL
TREATMENT OF TRADE SECRETS
The common law of trade secret protection evolved some time
after the drafting of the patent clause and the enactment of the
first patent laws.2' Although development of trade secret concepts
can be discerned as early as 1837, -5 the first case to formulate trade
secret principles explicitly arose in 1868. In Peabody v. Norfolk28
a Massachusetts court held that a trade secret is property and the
law will protect the holder against breaches of contractual or con-
fidential relationships that destroy the secret. In 1917, the United
States Supreme Court recognized trade secret law in E.I. du Pont
de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,7 but not as a property right
in the secret. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for a majority, stated
that trade secrets can be protected where their disclosure is a breach
of a confidential relationship between two parties.28  The Court ad-
dressed trade secret cases from time to time thereafter and acknow-
ledged that breaches of contract as well as confidential relationships
would be redressed by the courts. 9
2 478 F.2d at 1085-86.
23 The district court had granted an injunction of unlimited duration. Id. at
1076. Had the Court of Appeals not reversed, the defendants presumably could
never have used the secret formula.
24 The first patent law was adopted in Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Star.
109.
2 5 Vickery v. Welch, 19 Pick. (36 Mass.) 523 (1837). See Barton, A Study
in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CIN. L. REV. 507 (1939).
26 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
27 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
28 Id. at 102.
29 In Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929), the Court
noted that breach of a contract or of a duty arising from confidential relations are
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The question of the scope of preemption by federal law of the
area of inventions was not addressed by the Court until Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel CoY0 and its companion case, Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 1  Stiffel had developed a pole lamp
which Sears had copied in almost every detail. When its design
patent was declared invalid, Stiffel sought an injunction, pursuant
to an Illinois unfair competition law, to bar Sears from manufac-
turing and selling the copied article. Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the majority of the Court, refused to sustain the injunction. He
concluded that "the patent system is one in which uniform standards
are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time pre-
serving competition,"32 and therefore "fain unpatentable article, like
an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so." 33 Comp-
co reached the same result on virtually identical facts. Thus, Sears
and Compco mean that federal law at least bars states from enjoin-
ing the mere copying of an unpatentable item on the market. But
Justice Black went on to make the broader statement: "[JJust as
a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it
cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair com-
petition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives
of the federal patent laws. 34
The commentary following Sears and Compco was prolific, 5
and litigation was soon forthcoming. In the same year, the Fourth
Circuit faced the issue whether an injunction barring the use of se-
crets acquired through a breach of confidence was a viable state
remedy. In Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co.,86 Servo
matters independent of the patent law, and that an undisclosed invention does not
need a patent to protect it from disclosure by breach of trust. Accord, United States
v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
30 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
31376 U.S. 234 (1964).
321d. at 230-31.
33 id. at 231.
34 Id.
3 5 See Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-emption - The Aftermath of
Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 713 (1967); Kestenbaum, The Sears and
Compco Cases: A Federal Right to Compete by Copying, 51 A.B.A.J. 935 (1965);
Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a Federal Law
of Unfair Competition, 69 DIcK. I.. REV. 347 (1965); Treece, Patent Policy and
Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 80 (1964); Note,
Trade Secret Law After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REv. 356 (1967); Comment,
Does Stiffel Stifle the Law of Unfair Competition?, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 86 (1964).
36 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966).
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disclosed some of its secrets in confidence to another party who in
turn breached that confidence by passing the information to General
Electric. Servo sought an injunction against use of the secrets by
General Electric. The court sustained the injunction on the basis
that the traditional equitable remedy for unjust enrichment was ap-
propriate. It reasoned that Sears, which involved no breach of con-
fidence or misappropriation, was distinguishable from cases where
traditional principles of equity warranted relief for an inventor's
loss.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lear v. Adkins,3 7 the
only other circuit to consider the question reached the same conclu-
sion as the court in Servo.38 Like most trade secret cases,39 these
lower court decisions involved equitable remedies for breaches of
confidential relationships and contractual agreements. The absence
of these situations in Sears and Compco allowed the courts to dis-
tinguish them easily. But in Lear the Court used patent policy to
render an equitable principle inappropriate, and by doing so threat-
ened the existence of all state trade secret law. Adkins, an inventor,
had licensed his invention to Lear under a royalty arrangement.
When Adkins' first attempt to obtain a patent failed, Lear stopped
making payments. Adkins was later awarded a patent and he sued
Lear for past due royalties. Lear's defense was the invalidity of
the patent, but the state court held that he was estopped by his
contract from raising it. Reversing, the Supreme Court held that
estoppel to raise the defense of patent invalidity conflicted with the
federal patent policy that all ideas in general circulation be dedi-
cated to the common good unless patented.40  Further, the Court
called on the states to reevaluate all their laws enforcing contractual
rights of inventors to determine to what extent, if any, they conflict
with federal patent policy.41
Mr. Justice Black in a separate decision consistent with his opin-
ions in Sears and Compco was more decisive. He stated:
One who makes a discovery may, of course, keep it secret if he
wishes, but private arrangements under which self-styled "inven-
tors" do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather disclose them
3 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
38Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
39 See A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 268-73, 307-10 (1962).
40 Lear overruled Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827 (1950).
41 395 U.S. at 675.
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in return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our
patent laws ... 42
In brief, Lear invalidated an equitable principle like those that
the cases postdating Sears had assumed were not-jeopardized, though
it did so in a patent licensing, not a trade secret, context. Further,
Justice Black stated outright that the disclosure of secrets for consid-
eration can be no alternative to the patent licensing system.
Nonetheless, shortly after Lear, Judge Friendly was able to decide
in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.43 that patent law and trade secret
agreements can coexist. The parties in Painton had had a license
agreement for unpatented confidential technical information. When
the agreement ended, the licensee refused to return the information
and sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled under the
contract to retain the information permanently and use it free from
any claim for infringement or future royalties. The district court
held for the licensee by adopting the position that:
Our patent policy of strict regulation of inventions would be under-
cut if inventors could enforce agreements for compensation for al-
leged secret ideas, without being required to submit those ideas to
the Patent Office, and, thereby, eventually have the ideas disclosed
to the public. 44
On appeal the Second Circuit rejected this view and reversed
the decision.45 Judge Friendly concluded that the federal patent
policy is not undermined by state enforcement of trade secret agree-
ments. He viewed the patent system, where the inventor obtains
a monopoly for a limited time in exchange for disclosure of his
invention, as an exchange the inventor may decide not to make.
Though Judge Friendly acknowledged that patent applications
might be stimulated if all trade secret agreements were invalidated,
he was not certain that the effect of such a situation would be bene-
42 Id. at 677 (Black, J., joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas,
concurring and dissenting).
43 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
44 309 F. Supp. at 274. The district court opinion has been criticized, because
the preemption issue was decided without benefit of briefs or arguments from the
parties who were primarily concerned with the interpretation of their contract. 442
F.2d at 221.
4 5 Painton, who had prevailed in the district court, did not attempt to argue the
validity of the district court's opinion on appeal, but instead "declinerd] to argue
the question of trade secret validity on the present record at the present time." 442
F.2d at 222. Nevertheless, because of the importance of the preemption question,
the court felt constrained to deal with it Id. Amicus briefs were filed by Roger
Milgrim and the New York Patent Law Association, but both were decidedly pro-trade
secret. See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 7.08[2], at 7-70.8(3) to (19) (1972).
Thus the court decided the question without the benefit of arguments on both sides.
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ficial. Further, he reasoned that the choice an inventor has is not
between equally good alternatives and that an inventor would not
often choose secrecy over a patent because of the greater security
a patent affords.46
Sears and Compco were narrowly construed in Painton to stand
for the proposition that a state cannot enjoin legitimate copying
of an article absent any misappropriation. In reference to Lear,
Judge Friendly merely stated:
[W]e find no suggestion in the opinion that the Court intended to
cast doubt on a long-standing principle that an inventor who
chooses to exploit his invention by private arrangements is entirely
free to do so, though in so doing he may thereby forfeit his right to
a patent.47
In total, four circuits since Sears and Compco have upheld trade
secret law, despite the existence of the federal patent system.48 From
the time of Sears until the present, only the district court in Painton,
later reversed, and perhaps Kewanee have adopted Justice Black's
view that patent law is the sole available protection for inventors.49
Recently, the Supreme Court has also seemed to curtail what
appeared to be a movement from Sears to Lear toward rejecting
state protection of creative products. In Goldstein v. California"0
it held that states are not preempted by the patent and copyright
clause and the federal copyright laws from enacting laws prohibiting
record and tape piracy. The Court rejected the argument that Con-
gress had so occupied the copyright field as to preempt any state
protection.5' But in Compco it had said, "Today we have held in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra, that when an article is
unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law may not forbid
others to copy that article"; 52 and went on to say that for a state
to forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy "of allow-
4 6 See text accompanying note 96 infra.
47 442 F.2d at 225. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
48 Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Dekar Indus.,
Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 945 (1971); Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th
Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1964).
40 Kewanee may preclude state trade secret protection only for patentable inven-
tions that have been used commercially for more than one year. See note 79 intra
and accompanying text.
50 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
51 Id. at 569-70.
52 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1963) (emphasis
added).
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ing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright
laws leave in the public domain."53
Goldstein may represent a new view by the Court of the federal
government's role in the regulation of intellectual property. While
the Court's decision clearly places some restrictions upon the broad
language of Sears and Compco, the direct impact of Goldstein on
the trade secret preemption problem is difficult to assess. Congress
derives its power to provide for patents and copyrights from the
same clause in the Constitution. Both have the same purpose: "[tlo
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts."54 Yet, there are
fundamental distinctions between patents and copyrights. The leg-
islature as well as the courts have always been reluctant to grant
monopolies, because they act as an inhibition to competition. 55
While both patents and copyrights are specially granted monopolies,
the scope of the monopoly granted under the copyright laws is con-
siderably less extensive. Copyrights protect specific writings, not
the ideas in those writings, while patents protect ideas as well as
their physical embodiments.56 Thus, two persons may obtain copy-
rights for their explanation or description of an art, but only one,
the patent holder, can claim the exclusive right to the use of the
art embodied in his invention.5
Since a patent monopoly is broader and thus more inhibitive
to competition, the federal government has been more careful in
53 Id. The Compco Court's references to copyrights could be interpreted as more
than mere dicta. Theoretically, the lamp design in Sears could have been protected
under the copyright classification of "works of art." 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1970). In
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Court had held that statuettes used as
lamp bases were appropriate subjects for copyright protection as works of art, even
though the lamp bases were mass-produced.
Before Goldstr" was decided, Congress enacted the Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-140, 85 Star. 391, which amended the copyright laws to include sound
recordings:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this
title, shall have the exclusive right:
To reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the copyright
work if it be a sound recording ....
17 U.S.C. § 1(f) (Supp. 1, 1971). However, the amendment applied "only to sound
recordings fixed, published, and copyrighted on and after the effective date of this
Act [February 15, 19721." Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85
Stat 391.
54 US. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
55 See, e.g., The Case of Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 11 Coke Rep. 84b, 77
Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603).
56 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
57 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1897).
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its grant. A patent monopoly extends for 17 years, 8 while a copy-
right monopoly can extend for 56 years." Though novelty is re-
quired for a patentable invention," no such requirement is necessary
to obtain a copyright. Before a patent is issued, the invention must
be examined by the Patent Office to see whether the requirements
are met,6 while no examination is made of a copyright applica-
tion.62 This caution on the part of the federal government in the
granting of the broader patent monopoly was interpreted by the
Goldstein Court as an effort by Congress to strike a balance between
the policies underlying the grant of patents and free competition.
* . . Congress ha[s] balanced the need to encourage innovation and
originality of invention against the need to insure competition in
the sale of identical or substantially identical products. ... No
comparable conflict between state law and federal law arises in the
case of recordings of musical performances. In regard to this cate-
gory of "Writings" Congress has drawn no balance; rather it has
left the area unattended and no reason exists why the State should
not be free to act.63
Thus, although Goldstein allowed states to act in the copyright
area, it cannot readily be inferred that the result will be the same
in the patent area. However, it has been suggested that as a result
of Goldstein, Sears and Compco may be read to prohibit only those
state laws that have a purpose to provide monopoly protection and
to uphold those which extend some protection but are not directly
inconsistent with policies favoring competition.64 According to this
view, if the state law is directed at objectives which favor competi-
tion, such as preventing theft of trade secrets, Goldstein may be
an indication that the Court will be more tolerant than Sears and
Compco suggest.
III. CURRENT THEORIES OF PATENT
AND COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
Although courts as well as commentators65 for the most part
58 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
59 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
60 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
6135 U.S.C. § 131 (1970).
62 17 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
63 412 U.S. at 569-70.
64 The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 290 (1973); Note,
Goldstein v. California: A New Outlook for the Misappropriation Doctrine, 8 U.
SAN FRAN. L. REv. 199, 211-12 (1973).
65R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 7.08[21[c] (1973); Doerfer, The Limits on
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believe that trade secret law survives Sears, Compco, and Lear,
agreement is not complete, and a variety of rationales are invoked
to support their differing conclusions. Questions exist regarding the
nature of the secret to be protected and the extent to which the
protection can be afforded without conflicting with the federal policy
behind the patent scheme. Three different views on the constitu-
tional validity of trade secret laws have emerged.
A. Blanket Preemption Theory
One view, which may be termed the "blanket preemption" the-
ory6° concludes that trade secret law cannot coexist with federal pat-
ent law. It is possible to reach this conclusion by reasoning that
Congress has, by the enactment of the patent laws, manifested its
intent to deal exclusively in the area of protection of new commer-
cial ideas. Or, phrased differently, any trade secret law directly con-
flicts with federal patent policy.67 Some support for this view may
be drawn from Justice Black's broad language in Sears68 and his
separate opinion in Lear, where he stated: "[N]o state has a right
to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be a new
invention, except when a patent has been obtained from the Patent
Office under exacting standards of the patent laws." 69  Justice
Black's view was followed by the district court in Painton & Co.
v. Bourns, Inc.,70 which held that patent law precludes the states
from adding to the protection patents provide. Additional authority
for the blanket preemption theory might be supplied by the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Kewanee, which refused to enforce trade
secret agreements on the basis of conflict with overall federal patent
policy. 71
Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARv.
L. REV. 1432 (1967); Treece, Patent Policy and Pre-emption: The Stiffel and Compco
Cases, 32 U. Ci. L. REv. 80 (1964); Note, Trade Secret Law After Sears and Cornpco,
53 VA. L. REV. 356 (1967); 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 386 (1970).66 This theory is sometimes described as a congressional intent to "occupy the
field." For an example of where the Court found such an intent and held that
the states were precluded from taking any action, see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941).
" The conflict would consist of protecting secrets Congress intended should have
no protection. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
68 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
69 395 U.S. at 677.
70 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). See
note 44 supra and accompanying text
71 The holding in Kewanee may be limited to inventions that represent patentable
subject matter, however. See note 79 infra.
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While there is language in Justice Black's opinions in Sears,
Compco, and Lear that could be used to make a total preemption
argument, the facts of these cases distinguish them from trade secret
cases in general. None involved the misappropriation of secrets
or breach of a confidential or fiduciary relationship that are the crux
of trade secret cases. Moreover, the majority of the Court in Lear
expressly refused to adopt Justice Black's broad view.72 Thus, there
is no substantial basis for concluding that the Court had decided
to invalidate an entire body of state law.
It is questionable whether the Court could legitimately deter-
mine that Congress intended to occupy the field of invention, since
Congress has shown special respect for trade secrets in a number
of legislative enactments .7  These laws generally prohibit govern-
ment disclosure of trade secrets in cases where the federal govern-
ment has acquired confidential information and may be viewed as
congressional approval of inventors' maintaining trade secrets with-
out patents. Of course they do not necessarily mean that Congress
acquiesces in trade secret protection by state courts. Congress may
merely have meant to ensure that one who keeps a secret through
effective security measures is not lightly made to disclose it through
dealings with the government.74
Further, blanket preemption by patent law might be unwar-
ranted in light of the Court's recent decision in Goldstein, where
it rejected the preemption argument in regard to copyrights. Since
the purposes behind the patent laws and the copyright laws are gen-
72 The majority stated:
[W]e have concluded, after much consideration, that even though an impor-
tant question of federal law underlies this phase of the controversy, we
should not now attempt to define in even a limited way the extent, if any,
to which the States may properly act to enforce the contractual rights of in-
ventors of unpatented secret ideas.
395 U.S. at 675 (Harlan, J.). Earlier, concurring in Sears and Cornpco, Justice Harlan
had stated that "fv]indication of the paramount federal interest at stake does not
require a state to tolerate . . . predatory business practices." 376 U.S at 239.
78E.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(2) (Supp. II, 1972);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318(b)(2),
1320(d), 1322(g)(3), 1369(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1972). Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1970); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, § 405 (e), 82 Stat. 166 (1968). See Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton:
Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 17, 32 n.67 (1971) (listing 13
other statutes). See also Brief for Petitioner, apps. A-B, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., No. 73-187 (cert. granted Oct. 9, 1973) (listing 36 statutes); R. MLGRIM,
TRADE SECRETS § 6.02 (1973).
74 See Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting
Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 HARv. L. REV. 807, 811-13 (1974).
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erally similar,75 the Goldstein Court's decision that Congress had not
intended to occupy the field is an indication that, absent conflict or
interference with federal law, there may be room for states to act
in protecting trade secrets.
State trade secret law has traditionally afforded protection
against breaches of contractual and confidential relationships, indus-
trial espionage, and the unscrupulous luring away of employees with
special knowledge of trade secrets.70 Eliminating that law would
result in adverse economic consequences. The only way for an in-
ventor to protect a secret that cannot be patented would be to expend
the resources necessay for effective security. This commitment of re-
sources might pose a serious obstacle to small businesses and inde-
pendent inventors. Lack of legal protection would also decrease
the number of willing licensees, and it has even been suggested that
in the field of foreign licensees, absence of trade secret law could
adversely affect the country's balance of payments."'
B. Limited Preemption Theory
The basic premise of what might be termed the "limited pre-
emption" theory is that "only state protection that conflicts with
federal patent policy should be preempted .... -7' The states can
protect new ideas so long as there is no interference with the federal
scheme. Professor Adelman, who has set forth this approach, would
deny anystate protection for inventions whose subject matter is pat-
entable, as described in section 101 of the patent laws.79  Thus,
75But see text accompanying notes 55-63 supra.
76 Doerer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Anti-
trust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1432 (1967); Note, Trade Secret Law After
Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REv. 356 (1967); 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 386 (1970).
7 7 Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 17, 26 & nA0 (1971).
78 Adelman, Inventions and the Law of Trade Secrets After Lear v. Adkins, 16
WAYNEL. RE v. 77,93 (1969).
79 Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Preemption - The Aftermath of Sears
and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 713 (1967); Adelman, Inventions and the Law
of Trade Secrets After Lear v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 77 (1969).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) defines patentable subject matter as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof."
Despite the apparent breadth of its holding, see text accompanying note 22 supra,
the court of appeals in Kewanee may have intended a limited rejection of trade
secret law similar to Professor Adelman's:
Thus, we feel compelled to conclude that a state trade secret law which
protects an inventor in the maintenance of a monopoly of a device which is
an appropriate subject for patent under the United States Patent Laws is in
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since machines, formulas, and secret processes are patentable inven-
tions, no protection independent of a federal patent can be afforded
these items. However, such things as customer lists and general
business ideas, having value, merit some protection, and since the
patent laws do not specifically deal with these matters, states are
free to provide their own protection.80  Further, in addition to al-
lowing trade secret protection for inventions outside the scope of
section 101, the limited preemption theory would allow the inventor
of a patentable article to avail himself of trade secret protection
for a year of commercial use in order to give him time to apply
for a patent.81
The rationale for Professor Adelman's approach is that extend-
ing trade secret protection to patentable subject matter would frus-
trate patent policy of encouraging full disclosure of inventions by
grants of limited monopolies. The fear is that if the inventor has
a choice between alternative protective laws, he may choose a per-
petual monopoly through state protection and undermine the fed-
eral policy of fostering disclosure.82 On the other hand, affording
the protection of state trade secret law to inventions of unpatentable
subject matter should encourage invention without jeopardizing the
federal policy.83
The problem with this approach is that one class of inventions
conflict with the policies and purposes of those patent laws where the inven-
tion has been used commercially for more than one year.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1086 (6th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added). See Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and
Kewanee (Part 1), 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 736, 757 (1973).
80 Customer lists, however, may be an appropriate subject for copyrights under
17 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1970), which offers copyright protection for "[b]ooks, including
composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations." Query
whether, if customer lists qualify for copyright protection, and states cannot protect
articles appropriate for patents based on preemption, states should be allowed to use
trade secret law to protect matter appropriate for copyright.
81 The patent laws allow an invention to be used commercially for a year with-
out forfeiting the right to secure a patent, but once that year ends, the inventor
loses his patent rights. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
8-This fear seems to have been an important factor in the court of appeals decision
in Kewanee:
Counsel for Kewanee frankly stated in the course of the arguments be-
fore this Court that one of the principal purposes of maintaining the secrecy
of inventions, including those here involved, as opposed to seeking patents
under the Patent Laws would be to extend the commercial monopoly of the
invention beyond the 17 years granted by the Patent Laws.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1078 (6th Cit. 1973). But see
note 92 infra.
83 There is little danger of conflict with patent policy if courts grant trade secret
law protection to non-section 101 inventions, since by their nature these "inventions,"
for example, customer lists, will rarely have value beyond 17 years.
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remains totally unprotected. The inventor of a section 101 inven-
tion that fails to meet the other patent requirements has no effective
means to protect his work, despite its economic value.84 Conse-
quently, with respect to these inventions, there would be no curb
on predatory business practices." The result of Adelman's theory
is to give more protection to an invention not covered by section
101, which is usually a lesser advance, than to a useful piece of
machinery that fails to qualify for a patent because it was deemed
"obvious" to a person having ordinary skill in the art. The business
that guards its customer list will be protected by trade secret law,
while the inventor who develops a new chemical formula, which
is patentable subject matter under section 101, but fails one of the
other tests necessary for a patent, has no recourse to protect his
discovery. Since Congress has recognized the special need for pro-
tecting the items included in section 101 subject matter, it seems
inconsistent to deny protection to certain section 101 inventions
while granting protection to all non-section 101 inventions regard-
less of quality.
C. Nonpreemption Theory
The "nonpreemption" theory asserts that trade secret protection
is separate and distinct from the protection afforded by the patent
laws. The patent system is viewed as an exchange whereby the
inventor agrees to disclose his invention in return for a monopoly
on his invention for 17 years, if it meets the requirements for a
patent.80 The inventor, however, is free to keep his invention se-
cret and not participate in the exchange. Because under this view
84 See 53 BOSTON U.L REV. 1142, 1147 (1973); 45 N.Y.L.U. REV. 386, 392
(1970).
85 The limited preemption theory may place too much emphasis upon the section
101 subject matter requirement for patentability. There are basically five statutory
tests for patentability, and the subject matter requirement is only one of them. See
notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text. Adelman limits the area in which trade
secret protection will not be applicable to non-section 101 subject matter, while the
other four patentability requirements are ignored. See text accompanying note 108
infra.
The reason for using only the subject matter requirement may be simplicity.
Whether an invention falls within section 101 subject matter can be easily ascertained.
Determining if an invention meets all the patentability requirements, however, may
require extensive litigation. See text accompanying note 122 infra. See also Wydick,
Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and Kewanee (Part .1I -
Conclusion), 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 4, 12 (1974), where the author raises the question
whether Congress intended to bar state protection of information which falls within
section 101, but outside the other standards of patentability.
8 6 Wydick, supra note 85, at 18.
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patents were not designed as the exclusive method of protecting
new ideas, federal patent laws do not in any way preempt trade
secret law. 7 Thus, protection could be afforded to all inventions
that would qualify under traditional trade secret law. Sears and
Compco present no problem, since in those cases there was no
wrongful disclosure, but merely legitimate duplication which would
not qualify for protection under trade secret law. 8  Similarly, Lear
is read to have held that federal patent policy will only invalidate
contracts which license information already disclosed through an in-
valid patent; Lear did not involve licensing of undisclosed trade se-
crets.
There are essentially three policy arguments to support the con-
tinuing validity of state trade secret law. First, these laws provide
some control over predatory business practices in the acquisition and
use of inventions. Second, they encourage invention by protecting
the competitive advantage which flows to the inventor or his li-
censee. As a result, he should be able to recoup his expenses and
perhaps realize some profit from his creativity.89 Were state laws
to be invalidated, the inventor who is capable of producing his in-
vention commercially might still be able to realize a profit if he
could implement the security necessary to protect his secret. But
there is no opportunity for enforceable licensing arrangements."
Third, this licensing of trade secrets allows others to learn of the
invention. Trade secret licensing agreements provide a method for
use of the new idea by those who can put the invention to its most
profitable use9' and who can possibly make improvements upon it.
The "nonpreemption" view is subject to the criticism that it un-
dercuts federal patent policy by possibly granting a perpetual mo-
nopoly and thereby encouraging the hoarding of beneficial ideas.9 2
87 R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 7.08[8] (1973).
88 See note 10 supra.
89 Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 172 (5th Cir. 1969);
Doerfer, supra note 76, at 1451-56; 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 386, 392-93 (1970): 48 TEXAS
L. REV. 1399 (1970).
90 Milgrim, supra note 77, at 26, demonstrates the detrimental effect the abolition
of trade secret law would have in these situations, and especially recognizes the plight
of the small developers who lack sufficient assets to exploit their innovations without
licensing.
91 Judge Friendly in Painton stated: "[A] rule invalidating the licensing of [in-
ven:ors'] know-how 'will have the detrimental effect of limiting the use to which
the ideas are put, contrary to the public interest in maximizing the utilization of
intellectual resources.'" Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224-25 (2d
Cir. 1971), quoting 84 HARV. L. REV. 477, 481 (1970).
92 Whether the granting of a perpetual monopoly under state law runs afoul of
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This criticism is not entirely valid. First, to avoid potentially perpet-
ual monopolies, some courts in trade secret cases have granted in-
junctions limited to the time it would have been necessary for the
competitor who has surreptitiously acquired the secret to have devel-
oped it independently.13  This approach puts the parties in the po-
sition they would have been in had no wrong been done. It insures
some competitive advantage, curbs the wrongdoer's gain, and avoids
a perpetual monopoly by enjoining the wrongdoer only for a deter-
minable period of time."
Second, the assumption that the federal patent policy is frus-
trated when an inventor has alternative means of protection is ques-
tionable in view of the choices available. Those whose inventions
do not appear to meet the rigorous patent requirements do not have
a viable alternative other than trade secret law; those inventors with
potentially patentable inventions will be unlikely to choose the al-
ternative of protection under a trade secret law. Judge Friendly
in Painton stated that trade secret protection is probably an inade-
quate alternative to the inventor who has a patentable invention. 5
He enumerated several factors which make the choice of trade secret
protection unattractive: (1) the exclusiveness of a patent as opposed
to the nonexclusiveness of a trade secret, (2) the possibility of inde-
pendent duplication of a trade secret, (3) the forfeiting of the right
to a later patent application, and (4) the possibility of another in-
ventor obtaining a patent on the same invention.
In sum, the alternative of trade secret law may be less than
satisfactory in most cases and therefore should not be considered
a threat to federal patent policy. However, at least one commenta-
tor indicates that in some cases trade secret. protection may be better
than patent protection because of advantages like the possible longer
duration of exclusive use and the protection afforded in foreign
the patent-copyright clause is questionab!e in light of Goldstein. The Court there
indicated that the geographic limits on state-granted monopolies provided sufficient
limitations, and that the constitutional language "for limited times "can only be
understood as a limit on congressional, and not state, action." 412 U.S. at 560.
See Wydick, supra note 85, at 15-16.
9 Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973);
Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1967); Winston Research Corp.
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 356 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
94 This appears to have been one of the concerns of the court of appeals in
Kewanee. See note 82 supra. The district court had granted a permanent injunction
for an indeterminable time, and the court of appeals may have feared that the perma-
nent injunction would effectively create a perpetual monopoly.
1 5Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1972); 84 HARv. L.
REV. 477 (1970).
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countries.96 Accordingly, it is impossible to dismiss the argument
that state trade secret law and federal patent law will collide in
some respects. This is the shortcoming of the approach taken by
Messrs. Milgrim and Doerfer as well as cases such as Painton,
Servo, and Water Services. Although trade secret law may usually
be less advantageous than patent law, under proper conditions an
inventor who employs tight security measures and has an invention
that would be extremely difficult to reproduce could rely on trade
secret law to afford him protection the same as or better than may
be possible under the patent system.97  This situation would be most
likely to occur where the invention is a formula or a process used
exclusively in a factory and where analysis of the resulting product
would not disclose the invention. Under the nonpreemption ap-
proach, there is no effective curb to this kind of activity; the limita-
tion placed on injunctive relief by some courtse8 fails to cure this
defect completely. Before such an injunction comes into play, there
must be a misappropriation, and if good security measures are taken,
the illegal misappropriation might never occur. If the invention
is extremely difficult to discover, the fear of losing the competitive
advantage in less than 17 years is slight and there is little need
to secure a patent. Thus, once trade secret law becomes an adequate
or better alternative to patent protection, there seems to be inter-
ference with the patent law, and consequently the trade secret pro-
tection must yield.99
Because extensive use of trade secrets causes expenditures of ef-
fort to rediscover existing inventions, the nonpreemption theory also
results in a wasteful allocation of resources for research and develop-
96 In a table comparing patent and trade secret characteristics in R. MILGRIM,
TRADE SEcRETS § 8.02[8] (1969), the following advantages of trade secret protection
emerge: (1) The duration of trade secret protection may be perpetual, but patent
protection only lasts 17 years. (2) Trade secret protection does not require disclosure
of the identity of the individual inventor, while patent protection does. (3) Attorney's
fees can be recovered in trade secret litigation, but they can be recovered in patent
infringement litigation only in exceptional cases. (4) Trade secret misappropriation
is protected by both state and federal criminal sanctions, but patent infringement
is not. (5) Trade secret protection can be easily extended to other countries, but
foreign patent protection can only be obtained through foreign patent applications.
See also Note, supra note 74, at 821-22.
97 Perhaps the prime example of this possibility is the unpatented formula for
Coca-Cola, which has never been duplicated, although undoubtedly many have tried.
9 8 See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
99 Milgrim disregards this potential interference argument where the federal and
state laws are alternatives rather than complementary. He believes an alternative
given to the inventor is merely a right he possesses under the patent system. R.
MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, § 8.02[1] (1967). But see note 82 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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ment. If an invention is protected as a trade secret, valuable re-
search efforts are wasted by competitors trying to duplicate it. But
if the invention is covered by a patent, competitors' efforts are re-
channeled into developing new inventions. Competitors can either
try to "invent around" the patented invention and avoid infringe-
ment'00 or work to invent valuable improvements on the basic in-
vention and bargain for cross-licensing agreements with the original
inventor. In forcing competitors to devote their research and devel-
opment resources to discover inventions already in use, trade secret
protection tends to allocate resources away from the discovery of
new ideas. In addition, resources are wasted by the inventor who
invests funds to guard his secrets that could be used to foster further
creativity. 01 Thus, to some extent the law of trade secrets could
prevent new discoveries and accordingly runs counter to patent law
policy.
Trade secret law indirectly impedes employee mobility,0 2 and
the nonpreemption theory would maximize this 'effect by allowing
widespread substitution of trade secret law for patent law. 0 3 To
protect employers against having key employees lured away by com-
petitors because of their knowledge of the employer's trade secrets,
courts have upheld reasonable covenants not to compete and have
protected against breaches of trust. 04 When an employee leaves
to work for a competitor, he is allowed to use his expertise in his
new employment, but to use former employer's secrets may violate
a contractual obligation or breach a confidential trust. There is
a very fine line, however, between the employee's expertise and his
application of a previously acquired trade secret. As a result, an
employee can in effect become the.prisoner of his employer through
inability to work effectively elsewhere without using the secret
100 The classic example of "inventing around" a patent is contained in the Bell
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888). After Alexander Graham Bell bad obtained
a patent on his original telephone and had set up the Bell Telephone Company to
market his invention, Western Union decided to enter the telephone business. West-
ern Union hired Thomas Edison to "invent around" Bell's invention and avoid his
patent. Edison soon came up with the carbon-button microphone which was far
superior to Bell's diaphram microphone. A modern version of Edison's microphone
is still in use today.
101 See R. MILGRiM, TRADE SECRETS § 5.05, at 5-90 to -92 (1972).
102 See, e.g., note 105 infra.
103 This problem has been recognized even by advocates of the nonpreemption
theory. See Doerfer, supra note 76, at 1449-50.
10 4 See 6A A. CoRBnN, CONTRACTS § 1394 (1962); R. MILGRim, TRADE SEcRETS
§ 5.02[3] (1967); 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1645 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
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knowledge he possesses.' °5 By using trade secret law, the employer
clearly benefits, but the employee's mobility is hindered because
his value to a future employer will be reduced by his knowledge
of trade secrets.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The blanket preemption theory recognizes the supremacy of the
patent laws, but discards virtually all of trade secret law, even in
areas where there is no conflict with federal law °6 and a realistic
need exists for state protection. The limited preemption theory
saves state trade secret law in many cases. However, drawing the
line at nonpatentable subject matter inventions and patentable in-
ventions for one year of use denies protection to other unpatentable
inventions despite their economic value. The nonpreemption the-
ory, which would allow state trade secret law to protect all secrets,
could undermine the federal patent law policy in some instances.
Thus, what is necessary is a theory that incorporates the best features
of the present theories and minimizes the offensive factors of each.
10 7
10 5 For example, in B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493,
192 N.E.2d 99 (1963), Goodrich's employee, who was familiar with Goodrich's trade
secrets concerning the manufacture of space suits, went to work for a competitor
who had recently been awarded the space-suit contract for the Apollo project. Good-
rich sought an injunction barring the employee from working for any other employer
on the design, manufacture, or sale of space suits. Despite an absence of evidence
that the employee had disclosed any of Goodrich's trade secrets or intended to disclose
any, the court believed that "a disclosure of trade secrets to a competitive company
[was] seriously threatened" and ordered the issuance of an injunction consistent with
its opinion. Id. at 501, 192 N.E.2d at 105. It is difficult to imagine an ensuing
injunction that would have done less than virtually preclude the employee from doing
any of the work for which Wohlgemuth had hired him. See E. I. du Pont de Ne-
mours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 533, 200 A.2d
428 (1964); cf. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
106 See text accompanying note 72 supra.
107 Several legislative solutions have also been proposed. One such proposal would
be to enact a federal trade secret law which would be designed to complement the
patent system and give uniform protection for lesser advances. See Note, Trade Secret
Law After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 356, 372-75 (1967). Another solu-
tion might be to devise a statutory scheme whereby patents of shorter durations are
conferred for lesser advances. Such a system would be similar to the German Geb-
rauchsinuster. See J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 29-34 (1973).
The Scott Amendments to the current patent revision bill have attempted to deal with
the problem by proposing a nonpreemption provision:
(a) This title shall not be construed to preempt rights or obligations
arising by operation of state law concerning trade secrets.
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall authorize any state to grant any
person the right to limit the full and free use by the public of ideas in the
public domain or in general circulation.
S. 2504, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1973). The analysis accompanying the amend-
ments explains the provision as follows:
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The foundation of the proposed theory is that all unpatentable
inventions should be given state protection from misappropriation.
"Unpatentable" inventions would be defined as all inventions that
fall outside the subject matter covered by section 101, plus those that
fall within that section, but do not meet the other criteria for patent-
ability. Thus, if an inventor had a section 101 invention, he could
only rely on trade secret law if his invention would fail to qualify
for a patent under the tests of originality, novelty, usefulness, or
nonobviousness' 0 8 If it is not clear whether or not the invention
would meet the stringent patent standards, a prudent inventor would
make a good faith attempt to secure a patent in order to protect his
interests."1 9
There are three additional aspects to this approach. First, to
insure a good faith attempt is made to secure a patent, a party
charged with an alleged misappropriation could defend on the basis
that the inventor had an invention which could have been patented
at the time it was first put to commercial use.110 Thus, the inventor
of a patentable invention who has foregone a patent application
may be met by a defense of patentability when he attempts to en-
force his trade secret."' Second, to eliminate the danger that trade
secret law can produce perpetual monopolies, a further limitation
would be imposed. Injunctions would be limited to the time neces-
This section provides, first, that title 35 shall not be construed to pre-
empt state law of trade secrets. The latter term will be defined by the
courts. The section also leaves undisturbed the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The concepts of "ideas in the public do-
main" and "use by the public" will be given further content in light of the
existing case law. For example, one who obtains a trade secret by burglary
or theft would not be considered to be protected by the concept of "use by
the public." This section is intended to be neutral with respect to the anti-
trust laws.
BNA PAT. T.M. & COPYR. J., Sept. 27, 1973, at E-6.
108 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
109 See Note, supra note 74, at 822-24.
110 The inventor could still avail himself of trade secret protection after rejection
of his patent application since applications are kept in confidence in the Patent Office.
35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970); 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (1973).
111 Courts are frequently called upon to determine the patentability of a device
and have developed much precedent on the matter. In patent infringement litigation,
it is the usual practice for a court to be asked to render a declaratory judgment
of patent validity in addition to deciding whether the patent has been infringed.
7 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 588 (2d ed. 1972); 8 id. § 630 (2d ed.
1973). State courts also frequently decide the patentability of an invention in
conjunction with disputes over patent licensing agreements. 7 id. § 472 (2d ed.
1972).
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sary to legitimately duplicate the invention." 2 Third, to avoid pos-
sible misappropriation before a patent application is filed, trade se-
cret protection should be available to all inventions, whether or not
patentable, during the period of research and development and dur-
ing the period that a patent application is pending.
The basic rationale for allowing some form of trade secret pro-
tection is twofold and is substantially the same as that underlying
the nonpreemption theory. First, trade secret protection is necessary
to reduce and protect against predatory business practices." 3  As
Doerfer has stated:
The thief who steals plans out of a safe, not to mention the less
subtle industrial spy who employs physical violence to the person,
should not be heard to invoke the federal patent policy of disclo-
sure in defense at his criminal trial. 114
Legitimate reverse engineering cannot be enjoined, but surreptitious
means of acquiring another's trade secrets should not be tolerated
in the name of the patent clause. Second, it is economically advan-
tageous to allow innovators the opportunity to gain a competitive
advantage. Unlike patents, trade secrets do not enjoy an unqualified
monopoly, but merely a head start to recoup one's expenses and
perhaps make a profit until the secret is independently discovered.
While there is no guarantee that an inventor will profit from his
invention, at least he will have protection against employees who
divulge his secret as well as other misappropriations.
To avoid conflict with the patent laws, the scope of trade secret
law is more restrictive under the proposed theory than under the
nonpreemption theory. The first limitation is the necessity of mak-
ing a good faith attempt to obtain a patent if the invention is within
the subject matter appropriate for patent protection (section 101)
and it appears possible that a patent might issue. If it is clear
from the attributes of the invention that a patent application would
be denied, it would be unnecessary for the inventor to go through
the expense of a perfunctory patent application. The more likely
it is that a patent would issue, however, the more precarious it is
11 2 See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
113 Since the primary motivation for this theory is to protect against misappropria-
tion without infringing on the patent laws, this may be the very type of reevaluation
Justice Harlan called for in Lear. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. Apart
from suggesting a reevaluation, Harlan in concurring in Sears and Compco felt it
necessary to allow states to protect against "specifically oriented business practices."
See note 72 supra.
114 Doerfer, supra note 76, at 1447.
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to forego the attempt. This practicality effectively eliminates the
inventor's choice between patent and trade secret protection. In
the case of a patentable invention, trade secret law would not be
available after the first year's use of the invention, and thus it would
not impede the filing of an application for a patent. In fact, it
could increase the number of filings by requiring an inventor who
believed his invention might reasonably be patented to apply for
a patent and make a good faith attempt to prosecute his applica-
tion.115
The second limitation on trade secret protection is to ensure
through limited injunctions that states do not help create perpetual
monopolies on those inventions for which trade secret protection
is still available."" An injunction would issue only for the time
necessary to legitimately duplicate the invention. Such factors as
the time it took the original inventor and the difficulty in reverse
engineering could be used to assist the judge in determining the
appropriate time period. If it took the original inventor many
years, but much can be gained through reverse engineering, one fac-
tor would be weighed against the other to come to a reasonable
time. However, an injunction for a long period of time implies
that the invention would be very difficult to copy. If the invention
is section 101 subject matter, this may indicate that the invention
was sufficiently novel and nonobvious to be patentable." 7
One problem in requiring a good faith attempt to secure a pat-
ent arises if the applicant is unsuccessful in the Patent Office. The
applicant can then appeal his denial to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA). '8 However, if he is also unsuccessful
there the court is not required to seal the record and his secret will
"5 If the proposed solution were applied in Kewanee, the defendants would still
be allowed to use many of Kewanee's trade secrets. Kewanee had applied for parents
on some secrets and they had been approved, but Kewanee abandoned the applications
before final payment was made. See Brief for Petitioner at 35 n.11, Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., No. 73-187 (cert. granted, Oct. 9, 1973). In the case of these
inventions as well as any others Kewanee could have patented, Kewanee would have
forfeited the right to invoke trade secret protection. Kewanee should only be entitled
to trade secret protection for any lesser advances it could not have patented.
"
6 See note 96 supra and accompanying text
'17 With respect to non-section 101 subject matter, no presumption of patentability
could arise. Since section 101 subject matter includes processes, machines, and formu-
las, or improvements on inventions, non-section 101 matters will probably be far
less complex. Therefore, courts will rarely if ever face a situation where more than
17 years would be required to reproduce the secret.
118 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
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be disclosed." 9 To remedy this problem, the CCPA would modify
its policy to permit the records to be sealed if the unsuccessful appli-
cant intends to try to keep his invention secret. Courts will general-
ly seal records in trade secret litigation to prevent disclosure of the
secret, 20 and the CCPA's policy to the contrary should be changed.'
An additional problem which may prevent this theory from be-
ing fully effectual is judicial hostility toward patent validity. If in-
ventors are forced to rely on patent protection, they should be as-
sured that the validity of their patent will stand up in court. Yet,
courts have been critical of the Patent Office's determinations con-
cerning patentability. 2 To protect inventors under the proposed
solution, some efforts could be undertaken to increase the probability
that the Patent Office's decision would coincide with that of the
courts. However, there is no indication that these efforts are likely
to occur in the near future.
V. SUMMARY
State trade secret law developed to protect inventors of unpat-
ented inventions from loss of trade secrets through breaches of con-
tract and confidential relationships as well as other misappropria-
tion. The Supreme Court, by the use of very broad language in
119 The CCPA has refused to allow an unsuccessful applicant to have his record
on appeal sealed. The court stated:
If appellant had a trade secret, it was his privilege to practice it in the usual
manner, but when he asked for a patent on his alleged invention and
brought the same into the public forum of the court, it is not such a right
as a court (and especially this court under the circumstances) is authorized
to protect.
In re Sackett, 136 F.2d 248, 249 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
120 See R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS §§ 276-80 (1953); R. MILGRIM, TRADE SE-
CRETS § 7.06[3] (1967).
121The CCPA's nonsecrecy policy, see note 119 supra, was decided before the
1952 Patent Act in which Congress for the first time required that pending patent
applications be kept confidential in the Patent Office. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
1 2 2 Arot;nd two-thirds of the patents involved in infringement suits have been
invalidated by the federal courts of appeal. Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Com-
pared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 536, 540 (1968) (71 percent invalidated between
1956 and 1967); Tregtmeyer, For Greater Patent Validity, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 1,
19-24 (1970) (67 percent invalidated between 1953 and 1968). See Great Ad. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring): "[The Patent Office) has placed a host of gadgets under the armour
of patents - gadgets that obviously have no place in the constitutional scheme of
advancing scientific knowledge."
One commentator suggests that this problem could be obviated by making the
standards for determining whether a patent is required equivalent to those employed
by courts in deciding the issue of patent validity. Note, supra note 74, at 823-
24 & n.85.
TRADE SECRET PREEMPTION
Sears, Compco, and Lear, has called into question the constitutional
validity of a state's right to provide such protection in light of the
federal patent laws. There has been a good deal of discussion by
courts and commentators since Sears was decided; some have taken
the view that the patent laws preempt state trade secret protection;
some, that they do not. This Note has suggested that trade secrets
should only be protected when the inventor cannot obtain a patent.
The inventor must first determine whether his invention qualifies
for a patent, and if it does, the only protection he can seek is a
patent. Only if the invention fails to meet one of the criteria for
patentability can the inventor look to trade secret law for protection.
This scheme preserves the state law protecting unpatentable ad-
vances without conflicting or interfering with the federal laws in
the area of inventions. Its anticipated effect is to buttress the ex-
press purpose of the patent clause - to encourage innovation -
by ensuring that all inventions are protected.
HowARD BIuGMAN
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